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SHOULD THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT BE THE SOLE FEDERAL REMEDY FOR
AN ERISA FIDUCIARY
MISREPRESENTATION OF THE VALUE OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYER STOCK?
MARK CASCIARI AND IAN MORRISON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A falling stock market in the recent past has ushered in a
number of ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against
fiduciaries of tax code section 401(k) plans and Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOP) pension plans in which a portion of the
plan assets are invested in the stock of the sponsoring employer.
In the context of publicly traded companies, these claims routinely
follow on the heels of securities fraud lawsuits in which investors
allege that company management lied or failed to disclose material
information about company performance and thus offered
overvalued stock to investors. These tag-along claims typically
assert that retirement plan fiduciaries, who also serve as company
managers, have imprudently allowed the ERISA plan or its
participants to continue investing in the overvalued employer's
stock. To this extent, the securities and ERISA claims overlap.
We argue that, to the extent of this overlap, ERISA does not
provide an additional remedy. That is, for misrepresentation
claims brought against fiduciaries of plans holding publicly traded
employer stock, the exclusive and appropriate federal remedy for
these claims should be the one provided by Congress under the
federal Securities Exchange Act. In attempting to assert such
claims under ERISA, the plaintiffs' bar is simply attempting to
extract duplicative recovery and attorneys' fees, to the ultimate
detriment of plan participants.!
* The authors are partners at Seyfarth Shaw LLP, a national law firm.
They specialize in the defense of claims brought under ERISA. The authors
thank Brianne Gruszka, an associate at Seyfarth Shaw, for her considerable

assistance in drafting this article.
1. This article does not address the separate issue of whether ERISA
fiduciaries are liable for alleged imprudence in allowing continued investment
in employer stock. See, e.g., Difelice v. US Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 758,

775 (E.D. Va. 2005). This article also does not address the viability of claims
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Several legal and policy points support this conclusion. First,
it is clear that ERISA employer stock litigation represents a
problem of reconciliation of two federal statutes, which needs to be
addressed by the judiciary. In 2005 alone, there were at least three
publicly reported settlements of more than $50 million in ERISA
employer stock litigation:
1. Chao v. Enron Corp., No. H-03-2257 (U.S. District
Court/Southern District of Texas - September 10,
2005) ($365.25 million settlement of class action
alleging breaches of fiduciary duties under ERISA in
connection with the company's 401(k) plan; the
settlement is a general unsecured claim in Enron's
bankruptcy, and the ultimate amount paid will
depend on available assets from the bankruptcy
estate).
2. In Re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport ERISA Litig., No.
04-CV-1398 (U.S. District Court/District of New
Jersey - July 11, 2005) ($90 million settlement of
consolidated class actions filed by plan participants
alleging breaches of fiduciary duties under ERISA).
3. In Re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
228 F.R.D. 541 (U.S. District Court/Southern District
of Texas - May 24, 2005) ($85 million partial
settlement of class action filed by participants in
Enron's three retirement plans alleging various
breaches of fiduciary duties by Enron's officers,
directors, the plan trustees).
A continued pattern of such large settlements will discourage
employers from establishing 401(k) plans and will increase the
cost of fiduciary liability insurance or limit the coverage of such
insurance, making it difficult for plan sponsors to persuade
qualified personnel to serve as plan fiduciaries.
Second, in employer stock ERISA litigation where the stock is
publicly traded, the plan participants who make up the class (and
in some cases the plan itself) are directly or indirectly plaintiffs in
the parallel securities action, and already stand to recover for
losses to their stock holdings through a settlement or if they can
prove a violation of federal securities law.
Third, in many cases, the plan itself mandates or at least
presumes that assets will be invested in employer stock. This is
certainly the case with an ESOP, the purpose of which is to hold
employer stock, but this is also true with respect to many 401(k)
plans. In these cases, the employer stock investment option may
under state securities law. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006).
See generally Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal
Preemption of State Securities FraudCauses of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
3 (1998).
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be seen as a non-fiduciary plan design action that is not subject to
challenge under ERISA. While some courts have held that a
fiduciary should nonetheless divest employer stock holdings if the
investment becomes imprudent, doing so may constitute unlawful
insider trading or accelerate the company's demise by
undermining investor confidence, thus inflicting harm upon the
employee plan participants.
Fourth, for plans established under ERISA Section 404(c)'s
safe harbor, which allows a plan by meeting certain conditions to
shift to participants the responsibility for their investment
decisions, employer stock cases will likely revolve around the
question whether the fiduciary has disclosed sufficient information
about company performance to the participant shareholders.
Because ERISA does not supersede or undermine other federal
statutes, courts should not construe it to require a greater
disclosure than is required under securities law or to permit
trading on undisclosed information, or to permit or require
disclosures to plan participants that are not made to the investing
public.
Fifth, in the case of an individual account plan, the remedy
for an affirmative misrepresentation or material omission under
ERISA should be limited to injunctive "or appropriate equitable
relief" under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). This would preclude an
award of money damages because that relief would not be
"equitable." To the extent that a court is willing to construct an
"equitable" remedy, it is unlikely a court would award participant
shareholders additional relief beyond that available in a securities
fraud case because to do so would be "inappropriate" and thus
inconsistent with equitable principles.
Finally, corporate disclosure obligations under federal
securities law are the product of a long-standing and welldeveloped body of regulatory and case law. Courts should be
reluctant to develop a new and potentially inconsistent set of
disclosure obligations under ERISA.
While the current trend in ERISA employer stock litigation
seems to be to allow cases to proceed in some fashion, it is
important to recognize that most of the court decisions in this area
have been in the context of a motion to dismiss. Under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court in deciding
motions to dismiss must assume that the well-pleaded allegations
of the complaint are true. In addition, the Federal Rules generally
require only notice pleading, and many courts have rejected
defense arguments to require pleading with particularity of ERISA
fiduciary claims.' That is not true in federal securities cases.' In

2. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). See In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d at
821-22 (holding that the court would review the complaint and the defendant's
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comparison to securities litigation, moreover, ERISA employer
stock law is much less developed, making it comparatively more
difficult for defendants to prevail on a motion to dismiss. It
remains to be seen whether a significant portion of these cases will
survive summary judgment (where the case is decided based upon
a factual record developed in discovery and the complaint
allegations are disregarded) or at trial (where the plaintiffs will
bear the burden of proof).4
argument with liberal pleading standards in mind). See also Rankin v. Rots,
278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 866 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (ruling that the liberal pleading
standards of Rule 8(a) applies for breach of fiduciary duty claims under
ERISA); Cokenour v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 7921, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5286, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004) (stating that the notice pleading
standard, not the Rule 9(b) pleading standard for fraud claims, is to be applied
in ERISA actions). But see Calpine Corp. ERISA Litig., No. C 03-1685 SBA,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34452, at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2005) (dismissing
the plaintiffs' complaint based on breach of fiduciary duty because it failed to
meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) in accordance with
Ninth Circuit precedent).
3. In order to meet the pleading requirements under 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2003), "plaintiffs must allege that the defendant (1) made a misstatement or
omission of material fact (2) with scienter (3) in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security (4) upon which the plaintiffs reasonably relied, and (5)
that plaintiffs reliance was the proximate cause of their injury." In re
Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 137, 147 (3d Cir. 2004). Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), enacted in 1995, plaintiffs must
"specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement
or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u4(b)(1)(B) (2000).
4. Two district courts recently granted summary judgment for the
defendants in employer stock cases. In In re Reliant Energy ERISA Litig., the
plaintiffs alleged that investments in common stock were an imprudent
investment, based both on damaging public and non-public information. No.
H-02-2051, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3181, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2006). The
district court ruled that, since the company savings plan required company
stock to be offered as an investment and required employer funds to be
invested in the fund, the defendants had no discretion or fiduciary duty to act
otherwise. Id. at *10. Further, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' allegation
that the defendants made negligent misrepresentations in company filings
with the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Id. at *13. Rather, the
court held that the employer was acting solely as an issuer of stock when it
filed the Form S-8 and not in its fiduciary capacity. Id. at *13. The court noted
that the defendant did not incorporate the SEC filings into the Summary Plan
Description, did not encourage plan participants to rely on or read the SEC
filings, and did not issue a press release regarding the SEC filings. Id. at *1213.
In another case, the plaintiffs alleged that the employer and two
members of the Board of Directors breached their fiduciary duty by offering
company stock as an investment option despite the company's involvement in
an international bribery scheme. In re Syncor ERISA Litig. No. CV 03-2446RGK (RCx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 976, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2006). The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to investigate the prudence of
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The current wave of ERISA employer stock litigation may
ultimately have a negative impact upon plan participants. Given
the limited (if any) potential for a recovery beyond that available
in companion securities litigation, these cases may be motivated
by a desire on the part of the plaintiffs' bar to recover statutory
attorney's fees under ERISA and for non-securities litigators to
claim a portion of the fees essentially generated by the securities
litigation. The litigation increases the cost to employers of
providing retirement benefits, both by causing them to incur
additional attorney's fees and defense costs, and raising the cost of
fiduciary liability insurance and indemnification agreements that
a company provides to its employees who serve as fiduciaries. In
addition, otherwise qualified individuals may be reluctant to serve
as plan fiduciaries for fear of being embroiled in litigation
regardless of whether there is adequate insurance or
indemnification coverage. The frequency of those types of claims
may also cause employers to disallow investment in employer
securities, which would undermine the sense of employee
ownership that results from those holdings. Given these negative
consequences, courts should not be reluctant to find that the
ERISA lawsuits are redundant of the securities suits.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Background on ERISA and the Securities Exchange Act
1.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

Congress enacted ERISA5 to "assure the equitable character"
and financial soundness of pension and other benefit plans.6
ERISA does not require employers to provide benefits for their
employees; it does not mandate the establishment of any benefit
plans.7 If an employer voluntarily chooses to establish a pension
plan, however, ERISA requires the employer to meet specific
obligations, including those imposed by Part 4 of ERISA, titled
"Fiduciary Responsibility."
ERISA generally permits two types of retirement plans,
defined contribution and defined benefit plans. A defined benefit
company stock and monitor the plan. Id. at *9.The court granted summary
judgment for the defendants on both claims. Id. at *25. In regard to the
prudence claim, the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to overcome
the Moench presumption afforded to the employer. Id. at *22. Moreover,
"because the duty to monitor is derivative of the duty of prudence," the
plaintiffs failure to monitor claim was moot. Id. at *24-25.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2000).
6. Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 869.
7. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) ("ERISA
does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits.").
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plan provides a pension benefit determined by using a formula, the
variables of which are typically age, service, and compensation. A
defined contribution plan provides a benefit derived from the
amount of contributions made by or on behalf of an employee to an
account during his or her employment. Two common types of
defined contribution plans are Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(ESOPs) and 401(k) plans. The primary purpose of an ESOP is to
allow employees to invest in their company's own stock.8 In
comparison, in a 401(k) plan, employees may select from a variety
of investment vehicles, which often include bond funds, stock
funds, money market or cash equivalents. Often, an employer will
allow its employees to invest in employer stock as one option in the
company's 401(k) plan. Employers may also choose to match a
percentage of the employee's contributions in cash or with
employer stock.
Once an employer establishes a retirement plan for its
employees, the employer and various employees (potentially
including directors and officers), become subject to ERISA
fiduciary obligations. A person is an ERISA fiduciary only to the
extent she:
(i) exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management of such plan or exercises
any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets,
(ii) renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has einy
authority or responsibility to do so, or
(iii) has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.9
Under ERISA, individuals are fiduciaries based on the extent
of their actions towards the plan. ° A person's status as a director
or officer, without more, will not make an individual a fiduciary.
Furthermore, the mere act of signing or preparing an SEC filing
also will not make an individual a fiduciary." A fiduciary may
wear "two hats" under ERISA, for example, as fiduciary and
employer."
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3)(A).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21).
10. See Sprague v. Gen. Motors Co., 133 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 1998)

("[Fliduciary duties under ERISA attach not just to particular persons, but to
particular persons performing particular functions."). See also Gee v. Unum
Provident Corp., No. 1:03-CV-147, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3183, *49-53 (E.D.
Tenn. Jan. 14, 2005) (ruling that the defendants acted in a fiduciary capacity
when disseminating materially misleading to plan participants).

11. Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *50.
12. In re Williams Cos. ERISA Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1340-42 (2003)
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In employer stock cases, plaintiffs' attorneys routinely name
the following company personnel as defendants based upon
allegations that they are ERISA fiduciaries: The board of directors
and officers of the company, 3 including the chief executive officer;"'
the Plan Administrator;
the plan's administrative and
investment committee;" and the finance committee. 7 On the other
hand, in securities actions, primarily in Section 10(b) claims, the
affirmative duty to disclose has been traditionally imposed on
corporate "insiders," including officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders. 8
2. ERISA Fiduciaryduties
ERISA fiduciary duties, largely, arise from the common law of
trusts. 9 The basic fiduciary duties include:"
* acting "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries;""
* focusing exclusively on paying benefits and defraying
reasonable administrative expenses of the plan;'
" acting with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a
(stating that the members of the Benefits and Investment Committees
maintained fiduciary responsibility for their actions due to their discretionary
authority in dealing with the plan).
13. In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d at 817; In re Sears, Roebuck &
Co. ERISA Litig., No. 02 C 8324, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3241, *2 (N.D. 111.
March 3, 2004); Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3183 at *5; In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d, 511, 532 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
14. Cokenour, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5286 at *4; Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3181 at *6.
15. Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5. Under ERISA, the employer/plan
sponsor is the default Plan Administrator, but a different entity or individual
may be identified. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(15) (2006).
16. Cokenour, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5286 at *4; In re Sears Roebuck & Co.
ERISA Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3241 at *2.
17. See Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3183 at *6 (bringing suit against the
Finance Committee, to whom the Board delegated its authority under the
plan); Hill v. BellSouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(suing the Board of Directors Finance/Strategic Planning Committees).
18. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
19. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (stating that the
common law of trusts "governed most benefit plans before ERISA's
enactment").
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
21. See In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 546-47 (2003) (stating that
"the most fundamental duty of ERISA plan fiduciaries is a duty of complete
loyalty," which includes a responsibility to "exclude all selfish interest and all
consideration of the interests of third persons").
22. See Srein v. Soft Drink Workers Union, Local 812, 93 F.3d 1088, 1098
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant fiduciary's conflict of interest and
self-dealing violated its fiduciary duty to provide benefits and defray
reasonable administrative costs).
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prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use; " '
* diversifying the plan's investments "so as to minimize
the risk of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so;24 and
* following the written terms of the plan to the extent
they are consistent with ERISA.25
The first fiduciary duty, the duty of loyalty, means fiduciaries
must make all decisions regarding ERISA plans "with an eye
single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries. 2" As
the Supreme Court has held, "lying is inconsistent with the duty of
loyalty. 27 "Fiduciaries also have a duty of prudence, defined as "'an
unwavering duty' to act both 'as a prudent person would act in a
similar situation' and 'with single-minded devotion' to those same
plan participants and beneficiaries."28
However, as to certain qualifying 401(k) plans, ERISA states
"no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable ... for any
loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such
participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control. " ' Under Section
404(c) of ERISA, if an individual account plan allows a participant
to exercise control over his or her account assets, fiduciaries have
a safe harbor that relieves them of liability for participantcontrolled investment decisions."° Some courts have held that
Section 404(c) relieves fiduciaries of liability even if they had acted
imprudently in selecting an investment as long as the plan
participant maintained independent control over the account.31
There are four general requirements for an individual account
plan to meet the Section 404(c):
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B). See Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (defining
the prudent man standard as "'an unwavering duty' to act both 'as a prudent
person would act in a similar situation' and 'with single-minded devotion' to
those same plan participants and beneficiaries'").
24. See In re Dynegy, Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 876, 896 (S.D.
Tex. 2004) (dismissing the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim based on
diversification).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(D). See Hull v. Policy Mgmt. Systems Corp., C/A
No. 3:00-778-17, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22343, at *11 (D. S.C. Feb. 9, 2001)
(stating that a fiduciary must also act "in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of [ERISA]").
26. Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (quoting Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co.,
858 F.2d 1154, 1162 (6th Cir. 1988)).
27. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506.
28. Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (quotingBerlin, 858 F.2d at 1162).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B).
31. In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir. 1996), affd, 173
F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 1999); Wiseman v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 212
F.R.D. 482, 486-87 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2003), reaffd, 215 F.R.D. 507 (W.D. N.C.
May 27, 2003).
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The participant must be able to choose how his or her
account is invested, from among a broad range of
investment alternatives;
If employer stock is offered as an investment option,
special requirements must be met;
The plan must give the participant the opportunity to
exercise control over the assets in his account; and
The participant must actually exercise independent
control over the investment of his account.32

The fiduciary defendant has the burden of demonstrating that
the participant exercised control, and of demonstrating compliance
with each of the many specific components of a Section 404(c)
defense."
Overall, the law remains relatively undeveloped regarding
the Section 404(c) defense. Many courts have rejected ERISA
Section 404(c) defenses at the pleadings stage.' At least one court
has found that ERISA Section 404(c) is not applicable to the
selection of investment options in a plan and therefore offers no
defense to fiduciaries sued for failing to remove allegedly
imprudent employer stock as an investment option.35 In Difelice v.
US Airways, the defendant argued that it was shielded from
fiduciary liability by Section 404(c), specifically because the plan
participants were in sole control of whether they invested in
employer stock or other investment options." The district court
rejected the defendant's argument, ruling that Section 404(c) was
not intended to protect fiduciaries who failed "to exercise prudence
in selecting [pilan investment options."' The court noted that the
employer's decision to continue providing company stock as an

32. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404 c-1.
33. Unisys, 74 F.3d at 446; Allison v. Bank One-Denver, 289 F.3d 1223,
1238 (10th Cir. 2002); See generally In re Unisys Say. Plan Litig., No. 91-3067,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 843 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1995), vacated, 74 F.3d 420 (3d
Cir. 1996), affd, 173 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the application of
ERISA § 404(c) and holding that employer was not liable for participant
investments through a retirement plan in GICs because the employer had
satisfied all the elements of a § 404(c) defense; therefore, the participants'
investment decisions were the cause-in-fact of their losses).
34. See, e.g., In re Tyco, No. MDL 02-1335-PB, 2004 WL 2903889, at *7-8
(D. N.H. Dec. 2, 2004); In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207,
1234-35 (D. Kan. 2004); In re AEP, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30; In re Enron
Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 872; In re
WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 764 n.12 (S.D. N.Y. 2003);
Vivien v. WorldCom, Inc., No. C 02-01329 WHA, 2002 WL 31640557, at *6
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2002); Woods v. Southern Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1351, at
1367 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
35. Difelice, 397 F.Supp.2d 758 (E.D. Va. 2005).
36. Id. at 754-55.
37. Id. at 777.
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investment option, and the resulting loss, could not "plausibly be
viewed as 'resulting from [any] participant's or beneficiary's
exercise of control.' ' 8
The Difelice court noted, however, that in appropriate
instances, Section 404(c) could shield a fiduciary from liability,
"even when the fiduciary arguably may have breached its duties."39
Citing Department of Labor Regulations, the court stated that
fiduciaries would be shielded from liability under Section 404(c)
when:
a participant, exercising control permitted by the plan, directed the
fiduciary to engage in a transaction with a party in interest. In this
situation, the fiduciary would not be liable under ERISA § 406 as it
normally would because the fiduciary's breach in this instance was
the result of a participant's exercise of control. 40
Moreover, the court noted the congruence between liability
under Section 409(a) and the shielding provisions of Section
404(c).' Under Section 409(a), fiduciaries would not be liable for
losses to a plan that occurred due to a participant's exercise of
control because the loss would not "result from" the fiduciary's
breach, similar to the protections afforded to fiduciaries under
Section 404(c).42
In contrast, in Jenkins v.Yager,' the Seventh Circuit ruled
that even if a plan does not meet the requirements for Section
404(c)'s safe harbor, "there is an 'implied exception' to Sections 403
and 405 for participant directed plans, allowing plan participants
to direct the investment of their own plan funds."" The court
ruled that a plan does not automatically violate ERISA if it fails to
meet the requirements of Section 404(c). 4' Rather, "the actions of
the plan trustee, when delegating decision-making authority to
plan participants, must be evaluated to see if they violate the
trustee's fiduciary duty."
a. An ERISA Fiduciary's Duty To Disclose
"The law of disclosure under ERISA is both controversial and
evolving."47 A plan administrator may act in a fiduciary capacity
when he explains plan benefits, even potential future benefits, to

38. Id. at 776.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 775.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
Id.
444 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.

46. Id.
47. In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1182 (D. Minn. 2004).
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its participants.4 8' ERISA outlines several situations in which a
plan administrator must disclose information to plan participants,
including providing participants with summary plan descriptions
(SPDs), annual reports, and statements outlining accrued
benefits.49 The Supreme Court has declined to answer the question
whether fiduciaries have an affirmative obligation to disclose
material information on their own initiative, or whether they are
only obligated to respond truthfully to 'employees' inquiries. °
However, lower courts have found that the distinction between
employer and fiduciary "hats" may blur when business
circumstances affect the administration of retirement plans."'
In ERISA employer stock cases, plaintiffs typically assert that
fiduciaries violated an affirmative duty to disclose information by
failing to provide complete and accurate information about
company financial performance or other factors that are alleged to
have affected the participants' ability to evaluate their investment
options. Plaintiffs often argue that the employer withheld material
information concerning the financial problems or improprieties of
the company that affected the true value of company stock."
Further, plaintiffs assert that the defendants breached their duty

48. See In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (ruling that the plaintiffs
successfully stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on the
defendant's representations to employees). See also Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at
503 (holding that based on "the factual context in which the statements were
made, combined with the plan-related nature of the activity, engaged in by
those who had plan-related authority to do so," the employer was a fiduciary);
McCall v. Burlington N./Santa Fe Co., 237 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2001) (
"Providing information to beneficiaries about likely future plan benefits falls
within ERISA's statutory definition of a fiduciary act.").
49. Hill, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
50. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506.
51. See Hill, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1368 (denying the motion to dismiss based
on the plaintiffs allegations that the defendants misrepresented the
suitability of employer stock for investment).
52. See Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3183, at *17 (alleging that the
defendants "failed to provide complete and accurate information about [the
employer's] business improprieties, misrepresentations, and material
accounting irregularities and the consequential artificial inflation of" employer
stock). See also In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (arguing that
defendants should have disclosed the significant risks of investing in employer
stock due to the result of SEC investigations and its cross default provisions in
a financially troubled subsidiary); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litig.,
No. COO-20030 RMW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2002) (alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to disclose by
failing to inform plan participants that the employer was engaged in improper
accounting practices); In re Westar Energy, Inc., No. 03-4032-JAR, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28585, at *95-98 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2005) (arguing that the
defendants failed to disclose information regarding business and accounting
improprieties).
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to disclose by misrepresentations in the company's SEC filings
that were incorporated by reference into plan disclosures.u
Some courts are willing to find an affirmative fiduciary duty
to disclose material information beyond what is explicitly required
in the disclosure rules of ERISA.' According to some courts, the
duty to disclose information "entails not only a negative duty not
to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when the
trustee knows that silence might be harmful."" Some courts have
held that fiduciaries who know of company wrongdoing that could
harm the value of the plan may have an obligation to warn
participants.' However, such an affirmative duty to disclose has
been limited to situations when the fiduciary possesses actual
knowledge of material information that should be disclosed to the
plan participants in order to protect their investments.57
Despite the ongoing evolution of the duty of disclosure for
fiduciaries, courts also note that a new affirmative duty to disclose
only arises in "special circumstances with a potentially extreme
impact on a plan as a whole, where plan participants could be
materially and negatively affected."58 As the court in Hill v.
BellSouth Corp. stated:
In noting the changes in fiduciary obligations, however, the court
must emphasize that the mere fact that an ERISA plan consists, at
least in part, in employer stock does not mean that the ERISA
fiduciary duty to disclose plan-related information to beneficiaries is
transformed into a general duty to disclose the financial details of

53. See In re Uniphase Corp. ERISA Litig., C 03-04743 CW (WWS), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17503, at *37-39 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2005) (ruling that the
plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on
misrepresentations in prospectuses and other financial information provided
to plan participants).
54. In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 555. See In re Uniphase, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17503, at *35-36 (noting an additional affirmative duty to
disclose).
55. Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1300 (3d Cir. 1993); Hill, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1368; In re Dynegy, Inc., 309 F.

Supp. 2d at 888-89.
56. See, e.g., Barker v. Am. Mobil Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1402-04 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty of prudence
by failing to investigate his suspicions regarding plan mismanagement);
Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge
Sec., Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1175-1182 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that if the district
court found the defendant to be a fiduciary upon remand, the defendant would
be held liable for failing to disclose its suspicions of wrongdoing); Ream v.
Frey, 107 F.3d 147, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court's
decision that the defendant breached its fiduciary duty when it failed to
inform plan participants about severe cash flow problems).
57. In re Dynegy, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
58. Hill, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.
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the business: some sort of 'special circumstance' will be required to
trigger these heightened obligations. 59
Furthermore, in Difelice v. US Airways, the court held that
besides correcting material misunderstandings created by a
fiduciary's
own communications,
a fiduciary's disclosure
obligations are limited to making the disclosures specifically
required in ERISA and responding to information requests from
plan participants.'
In the event of a fiduciary breach, ERISA provides two
avenues of recovery. First, under ERISA Section 502(a)(2), 6' a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may sue for relief under
Section 409.2 Section 409 makes plan fiduciaries "personally liable
to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each [fiduciary] breach" and allows other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate.' Second, under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3),' a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may sue
for injunctive or other appropriate equitable relief to enforce a
provision of ERISA or of the plan. However, under Supreme Court
precedent, the relief available under this section is limited to relief
that was typically available in equity.'
3. Summary ofApplicable FederalSecurities Law
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), any
individual who makes a statement in a filing with the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) which, at the time, is false and
misleading as to any material fact will be liable to any person who,
in reliance upon the statement and not knowing it to be false or
misleading, purchased or sold a security at a price which was
affected by the statement.6 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act67
prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale or any
security... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or in
contrivance of such rules and regulations as the commission may
prescribe.'
Pursuant to Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which states:

59. Id.
60. 397 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
65. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210
(2002).
66. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Section 18(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78a to
7811.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
68. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 225.
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[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
exchange to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statement made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading.69
Rule 10b-5 is also the source for insider trading rules, which
state that corporate insiders, because they owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders, must "either disclose
material non-public
information publicly or abstain from trading [their] own shares for
personal gain.""° The obligation to disclose material information or
abstain from trading arises from "an affirmative duty to disclose
material information which has been traditionally imposed on
corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders.""' The Supreme Court has consistently held that
corporate insiders who have material non-public information must
disclose the information or abstain from trading based upon the
information.7 The duty to disclose before trading assures that
corporate insiders "will not benefit personally through fraudulent
use of material, nonpublic information."73
Over the years, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of
Section 10b-5 suits, including a requirement that a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant acted with "severe recklessness" 4 defined
as:
those highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that
involve not merely simply or even inexcusable negligence, but an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and that
present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is either
known to the defendant
or is so obvious that the defendant must
75
have been aware of it.
The Supreme Court has also held that Section 10b-5 claims
are available only to actual purchasers or sellers; individuals who
did not purchase or sell a security due to the fraudulent statement
cannot bring a 10b-5 action."
To decide whether an employee's interest in a retirement plan
constitutes a security under federal securities law, courts look to
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
70. In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
71. Chiarella,445 U.S, at 227.
72. Id. at 230.
73. Id.
74. Muir, Dana and Cindy Schipani, New Standards of Director Loyalty
and Care in the Post-Enron Era: Are Some Shareholders More Equal Than
Others?, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y. 279, 285 (2004/2005).
75. In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 643.
76. Id. at 639 (citing to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 731-33 (1975)).
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whether the plan is "voluntary" and "contributory."77 A voluntary
plan is "one in which employees may elect whether or not to
participate," and a contributory plan is "one in which employees
make direct payments, usually in the form of cash or payroll
deductions, to the plan."78 Retirement plan investments will only
be considered securities if employees voluntarily participate and
personally contribute to the plan." Conversely, "the Securities
Acts do not apply to a noncontributory, compulsory plan."'
For example, in Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., the court
held that an ESOP fell within the Securities Acts' definition of
"security" because the employees chose whether to participate in
the ESOP and contributed by giving up a certain percent of their
wages." In the Supreme Court case of Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, the Court held that securities law did not
apply to a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan in which
employees were automatically enrolled upon employment. 2
The Securities and Exchange Commission applies the insider
trading rules to fiduciary plan investment decisions,' and courts
generally agree that fiduciaries cannot engage in insider trading
in order to prevent losses to a plan.84 As discussed in section
I(A)(2), however, courts disagree whether ERISA requires
fiduciaries to disclose material, non-public information beyond
that required by federal securities law.
Investors may recover monetary damages for their losses in
actions under the securities law. There is no set of bright-line
rules for damages in actions under Section 10b-5, and one
commentator has noted that it is "a confused area of the law where
the courts, forced to rely on their own wits, have created a myriad

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 640.
80. Id.
81. Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1274, 1289-90 (W.D. Ky.
1991).
82. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 551 (1979).
83. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release
Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599 (Oct. 23, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm (noting that one cannot influence
the buying or selling of shares by a plan while in the possession of material,
non-public information).
84. Hull, 2001 WL 1836286 at *9; See Cokenour, 2004 WL 725973 at *5
(recognizing that defendants were prohibited under securities law from
trading based on non-public information but denying motion to dismiss as
premature); Thompson v. Avondale Indus., No. Civ. A. 99-3439, 2003 WL
359932, at *15 n.29 (E.D. La. 2003) (holding that in an ESOP divestment case
the ESOP must be treated as any other third-party shareholder and that
selective disclosures would have prohibited the fiduciaries from selling
shares).
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of approaches." 85 This confusion arises because Section 10(b) and
Section 10(b)(5) both fail to outline specific measurements for
damages.86 Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and 21D(e)
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) attempt
to provide definitions regarding damages, but the law remains
"open-ended" in regards to recovery. 87
Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act states "no person
permitted to maintain -a suit for damages ... shall recover,
through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act
complained of."' Further, Section 21D(e) of the PSLRA states:
[I]n any private action arising under [Section 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act] in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages by
reference to the market price of a security, the award of damages to
the plaintiff shall not exceed the difference between the purchase or
sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the
subject security and the mean trading price of that security during
the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the information
correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the
action is disseminated to the market. 9
The "mean trading price" is defined as the average of the
daily trading price of the security, determined at the close of
market each day during the 90-day period."
The Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States,"' outlined the traditional "out-of-pocket" theory for
damages in 10b-5 claims. The Court stated that damages would be
measured by the difference between the value of what the seller
received for the shares and the fair market value of the shares at
the time of the sale. 9 When the defendant received more than the
seller's actual loss, damages are the amount of the defendant's
profit. 3 Lower courts, however, have used other measures of
damages, including "windfall, rescissory, benefit-of-the-bargain,

85. Ann Morales Olazabal, Analyst and Broker-DealerLiability Under 10(b)
for Biased Stock Recommendations, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BuS. 1, 76 (2004).

86. Id.
87. Olazabal, supra note 82, at 76; U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(e) (2000). See Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule
10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 355
(1984) ("Because the rule 10b-5 cause of action is implied, courts have no
express guidance in determining the appropriate measure of recovery for a
violation of a rule.").
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2000).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(3) (2000).
91. 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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B. ERISA Employer Stock Litigation
In a typical ERISA employer stock case, an employer
maintains a 401(k) plan for its employees that offers the
employer's own publicly traded stock as an investment option. The
stock drops in value, sometimes due to company mismanagement.
Public investors sue alleging that violations of federal securities
law caused the value of the stock to be artificially inflated when
they bought shares of stock. If the value of the employer's stock
declines, the value of the 401(k) plan participant accounts also
declines. As a result, plan participants often sue the plan's
fiduciaries in an attempt to recoup their losses under ERISA. The
plan participants assert a variety of theories, including breach of
the fiduciary duty to disclose. Plaintiffs generally allege that
fiduciaries, who wear "two hats" (i.e., manage the company and
administer the plan), failed to disclose to or affirmatively
concealed material information from the plan participants
regarding the value of company stock.95 Plaintiffs rely on planspecific communications, such as SPDs, and on general
communications to the investing public, such as press releases or
SEC filings.'

94. Olazabal, supra note 82, at 77.
95. See Hill, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1365-366 (alleging that the defendant failed
to inform plan participants about the high-risk nature of certain Latin
American investments). See also Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 862-65 (arguing
that the defendants failed to disclose material information about the
company's true financial condition).
96. Plaintiffs often bring employer stock cases as class actions. Plaintiffs
usually seek to certify a class in an employer stock case under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1) or (2). 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires either
showing that separate lawsuits by "individual members of the class would
create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct" for the defendants, or that "adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that the defendants "acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief.., with respect to the class as a whole." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Some
courts have held that where plaintiffs allege a misrepresentation, class
certification may be inappropriate because each individual must prove
reliance on the misrepresentation. See, e.g., Thomas v. Aris Corp. of Am., 219
F.R.D. 338, 342 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (declining to certify a class asserting ERISA
breach of fiduciary duty claims regarding employer stock in a 401(k) plan
because plaintiff, "and every other member of the putative class, is required to
establish additional elements, such as reliance, in order to establish any viable
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In response, defendants often argue that disclosure would
have violated the federal securities law.97 Defendants also argue
that if they had disclosed information regarding the company
stock or taken other actions urged by the ERISA plaintiffs, the
company's stock price would have declined sooner or more rapidly,
causing further damage to the participants' investments.98 Finally,
defendants argue that the public disclosures were made in a
corporate, not a fiduciary capacity, thus removing the actions from
the purview of ERISA.'
Recent settlements of employer stock cases by the following
companies indicate the magnitude of these claims: Enron ($365.25
million settlement and $85 million partial settlement); Lucent
Technologies (approx. $69 million settlement ); WorldCom ($78.9
million and $47.15 million settlement); Household International
($46.5 million settlement); Dynegy, Inc. ($30.75 million
settlement); and Royal Dutch/Shell Transport ($85 million partial
°
settlement)."o
In the Enron case, the plaintiffs alleged, among other
arguments, that the defendant failed to provide participants with
accurate information regarding Enron stock and wrongfully
induced participants to direct their retirement savings into Enron
stock.'' The U.S. District Court in Houston granted final approval
for an $85 million partial settlement on behalf of all participants
in Enron's ESOP, Savings Plan and Cash Balance Plan on May 24,
2005.°2 Similarly, in the Lucent case, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants violated ERISA by misrepresenting the financial
status of Lucent and the true value of Lucent
stock, which led to a
01 3
settlement of approximately $69 million.

claim"). If a claim is brought under ERISA § 502(a)(2), there may be no need
for class certification because relief in such cases flows to the plan as a whole.
See infra notes 109, 113-115.
97. See In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d at 822 (noting defendant's
argument that it "would be subject to conflicting bodies of law, namely federal
securities law and ERISA"). See also In re Williams Cos. ERISA Litig., 271 F.
Supp. 2d at 1340 (noting that "in any event, any such disclosure would have
constituted a violation of federal securities law ..
98. Hill, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
99. Vivien, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27666 at *20.

100. Chao v. Enron Corp., No. H-03-2257 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2005); Tittle v.

Enron Corp., 228 F.R.D. 541 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Reinhart v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,

327 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D.N.J. 2003); Suntrust Bank v. Ebbers, 2006 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 3715 (S.D. N.Y. 2006); In re Worldcom, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 02 Civ.
4816 (DLC) (S.D. N.Y. 2005); In re Household Int'l, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 02 C
7921, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5286 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2004); Schied v. Dynergy,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861 (S.D. Tex. 2004); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport
ERISA Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605 (D. N.J. July 11, 2005).
101. Tittle, 228 F.R.D. at 544 n1.

102. Id. at 567.
103. Reinhart,327 F. Supp. 2d at 434, 446.

2006]

Should the Securities Exchange Act be the Sole Remedy?

655

The trend of significant claims and settlements does not
appear likely to abate any time in the future. In addition, a
number of well-financed plaintiffs' law firms with experience in
the securities litigation area have moved into ERISA litigation.
This means that employers and their retirement plan
administrators can expect these claims to continue.
Fiduciary liability insurance costs and coverage have
skyrocketed over the past few years due, at least in part due to the
increase of employer stock litigation settlements. These cases are
the fiduciary liability equivalent of a major hurricane and have a
similar impact on insurers. For example, the partial settlement of
$85 million in the Enron case represented the policy limits of two
Enron fiduciary insurance policies."' Fortune 500 companies have
begun purchasing fiduciary liability coverage limits of $100 million
or more, three or four times the level of such insurance a few years
ago." 5 Renewal premiums for fiduciary liability insurance have
increased up to 500% in some cases.0 6 The cost of director and
officer liability insurance, which is often implicated in ERISA
claims,1 7has also escalated, with premiums increasing as much as
200%.

0

Like any type of insurance, the cost of fiduciary liability
insurance is determined in part by claims trends. As discussed
above, given the pattern of high settlements, employers have seen
and can expect to see continued increases in fiduciary liability
insurance premiums.'
Insured or not, ERISA employer stock
litigation is expensive. Legal fees for defense of these claims can
run into the millions of dollars. While these costs may not be
chargeable to the plan as an administrative expense, employers
certainly view them as a cost associated with administering a
retirement plan.0 9 Thus, while those bringing ERISA employer
104. Tittle, 228 F.R.D. at 546 n.12.
105. Len Strazewski, Fiduciary Risk: a Sleeper Awakes, RISK AND
INSURANCE,
August
2004,
available
at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mBJK/is-9_15/ai
n6156493.
106. Survey Finds Massive Cost Increases for Pension Fund Liability
Insurance, 30 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS RPTR. 1691 (Aug. 5, 2003) (ISSN
1522-5976).

107. Id.
108. ERISA permits a plan or plan sponsor to purchase insurance for
individuals performing fiduciary functions in connection with a plan. Section
410(b)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b)(1), states that a plan may purchase
insurance "for its fiduciaries or for itself to cover liability or losses occurring by
reason of the act or omission of a fiduciary, if such insurance permits recourse
by the insurer against the fiduciary in the case of a breach of a fiduciary

obligation by such fiduciary."
109. Consistent with ERISA's fiduciary duties, an ERISA plan may cover the
costs of defending claims brought against the plan. However, the Department
of Labor takes the position (in its regulations and in two relevant advisory
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stock claims undoubtedly believe they are attempting to bring a
benefit to plan participants, these suits increase the cost of
providing benefits and thus may discourage employers from
continuing to offer retirement plans or as generous retirement
plans.
C. In The Majority of ERISA Employer Stock Cases, Relief For
Affirmative Misrepresentationsand Material Omissions Will be
Limited to Equitable Relief, Unlike in Companion Securities Cases,
Where Damages May be Available
While the courts continue to grapple with the question of
what type of relief is permitted in ERISA employer stock cases, the
view most consistent with the structure of ERISA, the applicable
Supreme Court precedent, and the nature of individual account
retirement plans is that relief for misrepresentation claims is
extremely
limited.
The
remedy
for
an
affirmative
misrepresentation or material omission under ERISA will be
limited to injunctive "or other appropriate equitable relief." This
will preclude an award of money damages because that relief
would not be "equitable" in the context of ERISA. Moreover, to the
extent that a court is willing to construct an "equitable" remedy to
fill this perceived remedial gap, it is unlikely a court would award
participant shareholders an additional remedy beyond that
available in the companion securities fraud case. Doing so would
not be "appropriate" as the Supreme Court has defined that term
in ERISA, and awarding a double recovery would presumably be
inconsistent with general principles of equity.
As noted previously, ERISA provides two avenues of relief for
a breach of fiduciary duty. First, ERISA Section 502(a)(2) provides
that "a civil action may be brought... by a participant, beneficiary
or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409" of ERISA." °
Section 409 holds fiduciaries personally liable for losses caused to
the plan by breaches of their duties. 1 ' It is well established that
relief under Section 502(a)(2) must inure to the plan, and not to

opinion letters) that a plan may not reimburse the fiduciary for his or her
attorneys' fees where the fiduciary is found liable for a fiduciary breach. Doing
so is improper and invalid under ERISA Section 410(a) and constitutes a
prohibited transaction under ERISA Section 406; DOL Information Letter to
J. Erlenborn (Mar. 13, 1986); DOL Information Letter to K. Maldonado (Mar.
2, 1987). In discussing Section 410(b)(1), the Enron court explained "[it is
noteworthy that the statute declares as void against public policy any
agreement or provision in an ERISA plan that tries to relieve a fiduciary from
liability other than those allowing him to delegate responsibilities to others,
who then become fiduciaries as to those duties and obligations." 228 F.R.D. at

550.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).

111. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
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the individual participants." 2 Second, ERISA Section 502(a)(3)
authorizes suits by participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries to
recover "appropriate equitable relief.""' In the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson,"' courts have struggled to distinguish between equitable
relief and legal relief (i.e., money damages) in the context of
employer stock claims."' Defendants continue to argue that Great16
West does not permit an award of money under Section 502(a)(3)."
As the current litigation has shown, this issue is not as
clearly defined as it might appear. In the context of employer stock
cases, the plan holds the stock, but it is held in the form of
participant accounts. Some plans buy and sell stock on an
aggregate or net basis. For example, if on a given day one
participant places an order to buy 100 shares of employer stock
and another participant places an order to sell 100 shares, the
plan would not have to purchase shares on the open market - it
would simply move 100 shares from one account to the other.
Arguably, under this scenario, the individual participant may have
lost money by buying shares, but the plan as a whole has not
suffered a loss.
In addition, courts have on occasion analyzed this issue as a
question of standing rather than the availability of relief. Some
hold that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a breach of
112. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985),
(remanded to 778 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[Rlecovery for a violation of
Section 409 inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole..
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
114. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 221 (distinguishing
between equitable relief, which is available under § 502(a)(3), and legal relief,
which is not).
115. See, e.g., Sereboff v. Mid. Atl. Med. Servs., 164 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2006);
Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 945 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding
lost opportunity costs are not recoverable as "appropriate equitable relief'
under ERISA section 1132(a)(3)); In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d at
1180 (noting Section 1132(a)(3) permits a plan participant to seek injunctive
or equitable relief for violations of the subchapter or of a plan directive).
116. This remains a valid argument even after the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Sereboff v. Mid. Atl. Med. Serus., 164 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2006). In
Sereboff, the defendant insurance company sought restitution from the
plaintiffs' tort recovery under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). The Court ruled that
the defendant's claim constituted a claim for equitable relief because it sought
'specifically identifiable" funds that were "within the possession and control"
of the plaintiffs. Id. at 619. Furthermore, the Court distinguished the
defendant's claim from Knudson, where the defendant attempted to "impose
personal liability ... for a contractual obligation to pay money." Id. at 620.
Unlike Sereboff, participant shareholders cannot bring an equitable claim for
restitution under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) because there is no specifically
identifiable fund from which the plaintiffs can seek relief. Rather, as in
Knudson, participant shareholders would merely be attempting to impose
personal liability for money damages, which the Court has held ERISA Section
502(a)(3) does not permit.
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fiduciary duty claim because only the plan, not the individuals,
can recover losses for the alleged breach.117 Other courts have held
that individual participants do have standing because if each
individual recovers, then the plan as a whole recovers for the
alleged losses."8 Other courts have framed the issue as whether
the plaintiffs can state a claim upon which relief can be granted,"'
but the analysis is essentially the same: whether Section 502(a)(2)
affords relief to the individual participants.
It is also important to note that whether or not monetary
relief is available to the participant plaintiffs, it will be limited.
ERISA does not permit punitive or other types of "extracontractual" relief."' As noted, the Supreme Court in Varity held
that relief under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) (if allowed) would be
limited to situations where it is "appropriate," that is, where it
cannot be obtained elsewhere. Because ERISA employer stock
plaintiffs have another avenue of relief (either individually or by
way of a claim brought on behalf of the plan as a shareholder),
their claims for ERISA relief are inappropriate under Varity.

117. See Milofsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 404 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2005)
reh'g granted en banc, 418 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding no standing to
bring such claims under Section 502(a)(2) because the ultimate relief sought is
reimbursement to the individual accounts of those who suffered losses and not
to the plan as a whole); Fisher v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 230 F.R.D. 370,
375 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that plaintiffs did not have standing because they
sought relief for a "specific subclass of participants" and not on behalf of the
Plan itself).
118. See In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 970, 990 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(declining to conclude that "a request to allocate relief among the Participants'
individual accounts in proportion to the accounts' losses constitute[d]
individual relief"); Kling v. Fid. Mgmt. Trust Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126-27
(D. Mass. 2003) (holding that a claim alleging mismanagement of 401(k) plan
assets arises under Section 502(a)(2)); In re Amsted Indus. ERISA Litig., 263
F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1129 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (concluding that Section 502(a)(2)
authorizes plaintiffs to bring a class action "to prevent or remedy any breach
of fiduciary duty owed to the plan"); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., 312 F.
Supp. 2d 898, 912-13 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (allowing claim to be brought under
Section 502(a)(2) because it was brought as a class action, and the plaintiffs
therefore would "represent the Plan as a whole to the extent the Plan was
constituted of CMS stock").
119. See, e.g., In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231, 235,
242 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing district court and holding that plaintiffs stated a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty because the "Plan held Schering-Plough
stock as an asset and that asset was greatly reduced in value allegedly
because of breaches of fiduciary duty").
120. See Cowden v. Montgomery County Soc. for Cancer Control, 591 F.
Supp. 740, 753 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that punitive damages were not
available to ERISA plan beneficiary who sought to recover under 29 USCS
§ 1132(a)(3) and 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for defendants' alleged failures to
comply with information reporting and disclosure requirements of ERISA and
pension plan).
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Even if an "equitable" remedy exists for plaintiffs in certain
ERISA employer stock cases, general principles of equity hold that
a plaintiff may not receive a double recovery of damages.1 For
example, in Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., the

court found that the defendant breached its fiduciary duties by not
adequately informing the plaintiffs deceased husband about the
terms of a reimbursement agreement he executed. 2 2 The plaintiff
sought a constructive trust over the proceeds of her deceased
husband's insurance policy as equitable relief under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3).123 The Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs
request, noting that her husband erroneously received disability
benefits from both social security and the defendant, and owed the
defendant approximately $46,000 at the time of his death due to
overpayment." Even though the defendant received $37,000 from
the deceased husband's life insurance proceeds because of the
reimbursement agreement, the deceased husband still owed the
defendant $9,000.125 The court stated, "the plaintiff could not
escape these facts," and held that she was not entitled to equitable
relief, despite the fact that the defendant breached its fiduciary
duty.2 6 There may be a complete identity of damages claimed in
ERISA employer stock cases and companion securities cases, or at
the least a significant overlap. The overlap is pronounced in the
case of disclosure claims being asserted in ERISA claims, greatly
reducing the potential for recovery under ERISA.
D. ERISA Section 514 Precludes Constructionof ERISA that
Conflicts With Other FederalLaw

ERISA Section 514(d) 2 1 states "nothing in this title shall be
construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law of the United States ...or any rule or regulation issued
under any such law."128 Courts have held that this section is a
"strong, comprehensive, express statement that ERISA is not to be
121. See Conoco Inc. v. Dep't of Energy, 99 F.3d 387, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that both parties agreed that equity forbids double recovery); United
States v. Job Resources for the Disabled, No. 97 C 3904, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12616, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2000) (stating that a claim for unjust
enrichment could only proceed if the False Claims Act failed because "equity
does not allow double recovery"); Montgomery County v. Jaffe, 897 F. Supp.
233, 240 (D. Md. 1995) (holding that equity prohibits double recovery where
the plaintiff had already received money for a claim but refused to give credit
to defendants for payment).
122. Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir.
1993).
123. Id. at 993.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).
128. Id.
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read as displacing by implication any pre-existing federal
legislation."'29 Therefore, ERISA does not supplant federal
securities law. 3 °
The difficulty in analyzing the interplay between ERISA and
federal securities law in ERISA employer stock litigation is that
the vast majority of decisions concerning this issue have been
decided at the motion to dismiss stage, accepting the plaintiffs'
(lawyers) well pled allegations as true, regardless of the facts. Two
cases, Hull v. Policy Mgmt. Systems Corp.,' and In re McKesson
HBOC, Inc.,"' have suggested that there is discord between
plaintiffs bringing both ERISA and securities suits. Other courts
have criticized these cases."'
In Hull, the 401(k) plan participants alleged that defendants
who were members of the company's plan investment committee
breached their fiduciary duties by failing to discover and disclose
the truth about the employer's stock value, which dropped
significantly in value after negative information was released to
the public.'
A separate securities class action initiated by
shareholders alleged that company insiders provided false
information or failed to provide correct information regarding the
value of company stock.' In the ERISA action, the court noted
that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the committee defendants
possessed any knowledge of the alleged misinformation of stock
value by the corporation. 3 ' Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to allege
that the committee defendants did not act independently of the
corporate defendants or that the committee defendants made any
purchases of company stock above market price.'37
The court ruled that the plaintiffs were attempting to hold the
committee defendants liable for the wrongs of others, thus creating
a different standard of care for the committee purchase of
company stock compared to other types of stock. 3 ' The court
reasoned:

129. Air Line Pilots Ass'n. Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 627 F.2d 272, 276
(D.C. Cir. 1980); De La Rosa Sanchez v. E. Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 29, 33 (1st
Cir. 1978); Bonin v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 621 F.2d 635, 638 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. Ventimiglia v. Gruntal & Co., No. 88 Civ. 1675 (RJW), 1989 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 12910, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1989).
131. C/A No: 3:00-778-17, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22343 (D. S.C. Feb. 9,

2001).
132. No. COO-20030 RMW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2002).
133. Kling, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (D.C. Mass. 2004); Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 3183 at *30-43.
134. Hull, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22343 at *24.
135. Id. at *6.
136. Id. at *25.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *26.
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In many respects, this standard would put the Committee in the
untenable position of choosing one of three unacceptable (and in
some instances illegal) courses of action: (1) obtain "inside
information and then make stock purchase and retention decisions
based on this "inside information"; (2) make the disclosures of
"inside" information itself before acting on the discovered
information, overstepping its role and, in any case, likely causing
the stock price to drop; or (3) breach its fiduciary duty by not
obtaining and acting on "inside" information.'39
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
committee defendants could have refrained from purchasing
additional shares of the stock, thus avoiding liability under the
insider trading rules. 4 ° According to the court, this would "violate
the spirit of these rules, and, at the least, impose a higher
standard on ERISA fiduciaries as to Plan purchases of employer
stock than would be applied to other stock purchases."' The court
noted that the plaintiffs did not provide any authority for this dual
standard. 4"
In In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants violated ERISA by failing to divest the plan of
company stock that the defendants allegedly knew was impaired
due to financially irregularities." The defendants, who included
the employer and former and current directors and officers, argued
that if they had sold the company stock and disclosed the alleged
financial improprieties, they would have both violated insidertrading laws and caused the stock to decline in value due to the
disclosures.'
Citing
to the
"efficient capital
markets
hypotheses,"'
.4 the defendants noted that the disclosures "would
have swiftly resulted in a market adjustment,"" that is, a drop in
the company's stock price, which would have actually harmed plan
participants. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss,
holding that fiduciaries are not required to violate securities law
"merely to protect the interests of Plan participants."'4 7 The court
noted: "[N]ot even a fiduciary acting in its fiduciary capacity is
permitted to engage in insider trading."'"
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *26-7.
142. Id. at *27.
143. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473 at *20.
144. Id.
145. The "efficient capital market theory" states that "because of the large
number of skilled profit-motivated investors continuously analyzing all
publicly available information concerning liquid publicly traded securities, the
prices of those securities in the market fairly reflects the value of the
securities." Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Icahn, 946 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991).
146. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473 at *20
147. Id. at *24.
148. Id. at *21.
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To date, however, the majority of cases have rejected
defendants' arguments that disclosing information regarding
company stock would violate insider-trading laws. In 2005, one
court stated that there is "an evolving consensus in the district
courts that there is no conflict between the requirements of ERISA
and federal securities law."" ° Courts have noted that if they
accepted
defendants'
arguments,
plan participants
and
beneficiaries would have no ERISA cause of action against plan
fiduciaries who possess information about questionable plan
investments, but fail to share the information due to a fear that
the investment value would drop because of disclosure."' This
result, most courts hold, would go against ERISA's fundamental
purpose: to encourage employers to offer as generous retirement
benefits as possible, while protecting participants and
beneficiaries.'
Courts note that ERISA and federal securities law share the
same goal of disclosure of material information, and the fact that
defendants are subject to both disclosure requirements should not
excuse their failure to comply with both." Some courts also state
that defendants could comply with both ERISA and the federal
securities law by informing the plan participants and
the
investing public about the investments or discontinuing further
plan purchases of the stock." Moreover, as courts have noted, "it
is impossible to rule out as a matter of law any and all ERISA
recovery at the pleadings stage simply because federal securities
law may provide overlapping relief.""5
It is clear, however, that there is at least the potential for
conflict between the two regulatory schemes. Even the U.S.

149. Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3183 at *43; Kling v. Fidelity Mgmt. Trust
Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.C. Mass. 2004); In re Uniphase Corp. ERISA

Litig., Master File C 03-04743 CW (WWS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17503 (N.D.
Cal. 2005); Rankin v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2003); In re
Williams Cos. ERISA Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Ok. 2003); In re Xcel
Energy, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D.C. Minn. 2004); In re AEP ERISA Litig.,
327 F. Supp. 2d 812 (2004); Vivien v. WorldCom, Inc., No. C 02-01329, 2002

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27666 (N.D. Cal. 2002); In re Enron Corp. Secs., Deriv. &
ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
150. Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3183 at *36; Rankin, 278 F.Supp.2d at 874-

875 (holding "the duties under ERISA and duties under securities law can
exist concomitantly").
151. Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3183 at *42-6. But see Cokenour, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5286 at *24 (stating "a public disclosure of the wrongdoing or a

notification of others that might leak the information to the public would have
caused the stock price to fall and the losses would result to the Plan
regardless").

152. Gee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3183 at *43.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *44; In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823 (2004).
155. Vivien, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27666 at *25.
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Department of Labor, in an amicus brief submitted in the Enron
litigation, acknowledged that there is at least the potential for a
conflict or inconsistency between the two regulatory schemes."'
Defendants' duty to "disclose or abstain" under the securities laws
does not immunize them from a claim that they failed in their
conduct as ERISA fiduciaries. To the contrary, while their Securities
Act and ERISA duties may conflict in some respects, they are
congruent in others, and there are certain steps that could have
been taken that would have satisfied both duties to the benefit of
the plans. First and foremost, nothing in the securities laws would
have prohibited them from disclosing the information to other
shareholders and the public at large, or from forcing [the company]
to do so.""
While the Department of Labor was willing to concede only a
limited potential for conflict existed by stating "[wihile the
Administrative Committee arguably could not have sold the plan's
Enron stock without full market disclosure, they were neither
allowed under ERISA nor required under securities law to do
nothing,"1 8 the concession nonetheless is telling.
It is worth repeating that the majority of the cases have been
decided at the motion to dismiss stage. This means that "the
allegations of the complaint are generally taken as true," limiting
courts to deciding whether it would be impossible for the plaintiffs
to recover. 9 Because they were deciding cases based upon the well
pled allegations which of course were written by sophisticated
plaintiffs' counsel, the question confronted by these courts was not
whether the ERISA disclosure proposed by the plaintiffs actually
was inconsistent with securities law disclosure requirements but
simply whether there existed the potential for some set of facts
under which the two were not inconsistent. The courts could only
dismiss the claim if, under all possible fact scenarios, there still
would have been a conflict between the ERISA and the securities
law disclosure obligations. If there is a reasonable possibility that
there would be no inconsistency, then the court would feel bound
by procedural rules to reject the defendants' motions to dismiss.
Indeed, despite the fact that many district courts have rejected
defendants' arguments regarding the discord between ERISA and
securities law, most district courts note that this argument is best

156. Brief of Amicus Curiae Secretary of Labor at *26, Tittle v. Enron Corp.,
284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (No. H-01-3913), 2002 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 5, at
*26.
157. Kling, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (citing In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d
at 566).
158. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 151, at *29.
159. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322
(1972).
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reserved for a later stage of the litigation when the record can be
more fully developed."
E. Compelling Policy Reasons Show That ERISA Plaintiffs
Should Not Receive a Remedy Greater Than Similarly Situated,
Non-participantWho are Plaintiffs in a Companion Securities Case
In addition to the purely legal reasons already discussed, the
limitations on relief under ERISA and the statutory mandate that
ERISA not interfere with other federal statutes, several other
factors support the conclusion that ERISA should not allow
additional relief in disclosure cases.
While the plaintiffs in ERISA employer stock cases may be
able to make compelling policy arguments for some claims, there is
a subset of these claims in which the ERISA action appears to be
nothing more than a redundancy. This is true for cases where an
employer that makes its own publicly traded stock available as an
investment option in its 401(k) plan, and is alleged to have made
inaccurate (or failed to make) disclosures regarding company
performance or finances, and is the target of an ongoing securities
fraud action based upon the same false or insufficient disclosure.
In these types of cases, there should be no separate ERISA
remedy.
1. Requiring Employers to Divest Company Stock Would Likely
ConstituteInsider Trading Or Accelerate The Company's Demise
Courts have generally been unwilling to accept, at the motion
to dismiss stage, the defense offered by fiduciaries that, as a
matter of law, their hands were tied, that there was nothing they
could have done to divest the plan of its employer stock holdings,
or warn participants of problems with the stock that would not
have either hastened the demise of the company or constituted
unlawful insider trading. The court decisions do not, however,
suggest what plan fiduciaries should have done consistent with
their fiduciary and security law obligations. Considering the facts
of the cases that have been filed thus far, as a practical matter, it
is logical that if fiduciaries had engaged in a sell-off of employer
securities or had publicly announced their alleged concerns about
the company's "true" condition, bad things would have happened.
Clearly, dumping large quantities of stock on the market would
depress the price. It would alarm investors, likely prompting a
further sell-off. It is a fact of modern corporate life that
plummeting stock prices lead to layoffs and other "performance
enhancing" measures, which would hardly benefit plan
participants.

160. In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d at 823.
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2. The Plan Should Not be Allowed a Double Recovery Under
Both A SecuritiesAction and a "Derivative"ERISA Claim
To the extent the plan itself is a shareholder and has
allegedly been harmed by the investment in employer stock, the
plan may recover in the securities case to the same extent as any
other shareholder, and it should not be allowed a double recovery
by virtue of a "derivative" ERISA claim.
3. ERISA Section 404(c) Demonstrates That CongressDid Not
Intend ForERISA FiduciariesTo BearResponsibility ForAll Plan
Investment Decisions
Despite uncertainty regarding the precise scope of the
Section 404(c) safe harbor, Section 404(c) demonstrates an
important policy choice. To the extent plan participants are
charged with making their own investment decisions, they, and
not the plan's fiduciaries, should be responsible for those decisions.
Moreover, this section demonstrates Congress's intent to treat
participants the same as individual investors in particular
investment funds offered through the plan. There is no valid
reason to assume that just because one such option is employer
stock, a wholly different set of rules should apply.
4. PlansHolding Employer Stock Often Are Designed To Do So.
ERISA plan design is a matter not subject to challenge under
ERISA's fiduciary rules. All ESOPs and many 401(k) plans are
specifically designed to hold employer stock. In the case of a 401(k)
plan, the plan may require employer stock as one investment
option or that company matching contributions be made in
company stock.' Some 401(k) plans now contain mini-ESOPs to
hold employer stock and take advantage of the so-called "ESOP
presumption." Allowing recovery for breach of fiduciary duty for
permitting investment in employer stock simply permits plaintiffs
to avoid the well-settled law that plan design choices cannot be
challenged under ERISA's fiduciary rules.'62
161. See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., MDL
Docket No. 1500, 02 Civ. 8853, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3715, at *18 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 10, 2005) (showing the defendants arguing that they should not be held
liable for failing to divest company stock holdings because the plan mandated
the availability of a company stock fund). The court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss, holding that further factual development was required. Id.
at *16-17.
162. See, e.g., Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1310, at *52-3
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (dismissing claims of fiduciary breach where plan mandated
employer stock investment options; where such options are required, fiduciary
does not breach diversification and prudence requirements by allowing
investment in qualifying employer securities).
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5. Securities Law Has Developed Over Decades And There Are
Well Settled Rules on How To Proceed - Not So With ERISA.
The recent spate of ERISA employer stock cases reveals the
peril of attempting to establish the rules to govern nationwide
ERISA plans through a process of disparate nationwide litigation
that often is the product of facts that suggest criminal behavior,
and yet rules are being established for the much broader type of
cases that do not suggest a crime. It is hardly surprising that the
developing case law on the issues presented by stock drop cases is
diverse, inconsistent, and inconclusive. There thus is even more of
a reason to defer to a well-developed and time-tested body of
federal securities law. Adopting the view that at least a subset of
ERISA employer stock cases are entirely supplanted by the
existing, well-developed securities regulation scheme makes sense
and does not risk leaving participants without a remedy or
defendants without a fair day in court.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the legal and policy reasons discussed in this article,
courts should refuse to entertain efforts at double recovery that
are represented by ERISA employer stock claims based on
inaccurate
or
non-existent
disclosures
about
company
performance. Allowing plaintiffs to pursue these claims and to
recover damages is inconsistent with ERISA's clear dictate that
the statute not interferes with existing federal regulatory systems,
such as the securities regulation system that governs such
disclosures. ERISA provides limited, if any, meaningful remedy
for participants in these types of cases, and it would be
inconsistent with ERISA and general principles of equity to allow
a recovery beyond that already allowed under securities law.
Finally, a variety of policy reasons show that this outcome, far
from being to the detriment of participants, is consistent with the
federal policies reflected in ERISA and federal securities law. A
further benefit from limiting claims and recoveries is to help
control the cost to employers of providing retirement benefits,
which is consistent with the purposes of ERISA.

